Reframing uranium: energy security and Australia’s critical minerals future

While critical minerals have long been assessed by reference to trade or export strength, they are now increasingly framed through the lens of security, resilience and regulatory control. Geopolitical volatility, tightening energy transition timelines and the rapid expansion of AI‑driven infrastructure have exposed how dependent modern economies are on a narrow set of strategically significant materials. 

Uranium is emerging as an important part of this shift. Internationally, it is being repositioned as a strategic asset underpinning energy security, defence capability and long‑term industrial resilience. In this context, Australia’s approach remains distinctive – shaped by an export‑focused framework and restrictions on domestic production and use. As global critical minerals strategies evolve and regulatory and investment pressure increases, the key question is whether the current regulatory framework for uranium should be reframed.

Critical minerals are considered essential to economic and national security, with supply chains that are vulnerable to disruption. In recent years, global competition for critical minerals has intensified, bringing increased regulatory and policy focus to how these materials are defined and managed.¹

Most major jurisdictions, including the United States, China, the United Kingdom and Australia, have adopted critical minerals lists, and the categorisation as ‘critical’ can significantly alter a mineral’s legal and regulatory treatment. However, the concept of a ‘critical mineral’ is not uniform across jurisdictions. While the underlying focus – managing supply disruption risk for materials essential to future economies and national security – is broadly shared, national definitions vary according to natural resource endowment, domestic demand and strategic priorities. 

In practice, critical mineral designation typically unlocks access to government financial support and may also trigger expedited permitting regimes or priority regulatory treatment. In some jurisdictions, it also enables export licensing requirements or export bans. These tools play an important role in stimulating investment and project development, while shaping export and import outcomes.

Uranium in Australia: regulatory settings and strategic constraints

Uranium has come into sharper focus in recent months, in part due to the Iran conflict and renewed attention on its potential use in nuclear weapons and national defence capability. More broadly, uranium is attracting sustained international interest as it is increasingly recognised as playing a role in energy transition. In particular, it’s been identified as a potentially key source of reliable, virtually greenhouse-gas-free baseload electricity for energy-intensive infrastructure such as data centres. For these reasons, uranium is classified as a critical mineral or treated as strategically important through other policy mechanisms (such as state ownership, stockpiling, export controls, or nuclear fuel security strategies) in a number of key jurisdictions.²

In contrast, Australia does not currently treat uranium as a critical mineral or strategic resource in the affirmative sense of actively promoting it for national economic or energy security purposes. This is notable, as Australia holds around one-third of the world's known recoverable uranium resources, making it the single largest resource holder globally.³ In contrast, Australia acknowledges uranium's strategic distinctiveness and governs it through a dedicated, restrictive policy framework. Currently, uranium mining is permitted only in South Australia and the Northern Territory and nuclear power generation is prohibited. In practice, this means there is no domestic demand for uranium for electricity generation and all production is exported.⁴

Critical minerals policy: comparing Australia, the United States and China

In determining how to reshape policy, it is instructive to consider the approach of key jurisdictions. Australia defines a critical mineral as one that is essential to modern technologies, economies, or national security, for which Australia has geological resource potential, which is in demand from strategic international partners, and whose supply chain is at risk of disruption. Reflecting Australia’s position as a major producer and exporter of mineral resources, its critical and strategic minerals framework is oriented primarily toward export markets rather than broader supply chain or domestic demand dynamics. As a result, a mineral such as uranium – which is abundant in Australia and has diversified export markets – is less likely to be classified as ‘critical’, even where other jurisdictions assess the same mineral as critical to their own economies.⁵

Under its Energy Act of 2020, the United States adopts a similar definition, framing a critical mineral as one that is essential to economic or national security, vulnerable to supply chain disruption, and necessary for the manufacture of products whose absence would have significant national security or economic consequences. While the US definition originally excluded ‘fuel minerals’ including uranium, uranium was added to the US Critical Minerals List in November 2025, reflecting its significance for both electricity generation and national security. Consistent with that shift, the US government has commenced establishing a domestic strategic uranium reserve to support long-term energy security.

China adopts a broader and more integrated approach, framing critical minerals through the concept of ‘strategic minerals’. Rather than focusing primarily on import vulnerability, China’s approach emphasises maintaining strategic advantage and ensuring self-sufficiency in resources where it faces domestic shortfalls. This strategy extends across the entire supply chain for critical minerals – from mining and processing through to end-use manufacturing – and has supported China’s dominant global market position in both mining and refining of critical minerals. Uranium is included on China's ‘strategic minerals’ list, with domestic resources subject to foreign investment restrictions and export controls.

Australia’s energy supply and demand: implications for long-term strategy

Australia's east coast is facing a tightening energy market, with significant risks of gas and electricity shortfalls anticipated in the coming years, alongside continuing price escalation affecting businesses, industry and employment. These pressures have been forecast for some time, including prior to recent events in the Middle East, and as part of the 2025 Gas Market Review, the government is actively considering the introduction of a mandatory domestic gas reservation scheme.

At the same time, global growth in AI is driving a data centre boom in Australia.Data centres are highly energy-intensive, making a stable and cost-effective energy supply threshold issue for any project. This demand is also emerging alongside a continuing policy focus on diversifying away from fossil fuels to cleaner sources of power. Against this background it is interesting to note that in 2024-2025 a number of major United States technology companies entered into long-term power purchase agreements, co-location arrangements and direct equity investments with nuclear power operators and small modular nuclear reactor (SMR) developers in the United States, seeking access to reliable, baseload, low-emissions electricity for energy-intensive operations.⁶

While nuclear power – particularly through SMRs – continues to raise questions around project costs, regulatory complexity and delivery timelines (with initial dedicated SMR capacity not expected before 2030), there are clear indications that global industry is planning for nuclear as a future supply source. More broadly, nuclear power already forms a significant part of the global energy mix, with over thirty countries generating electricity from nuclear facilities. France, for example, generates approximately 70% of its domestic electricity from nuclear power and exports surplus supply to other countries. 

Against this backdrop, Australia’s target of sourcing around 82% of electricity from renewable generation is ambitious and internationally distinctive. While renewable energy will undoubtedly play a central and growing role in electricity supply, the potential role of nuclear power within the future energy mix remains an active and important area of industry consideration. 

Australia’s energy security: strategic policy priorities for critical minerals

Against this background, there are compelling reasons for Australia to consider how the uranium and nuclear energy sectors are regulated over the long term. Recent policy developments in NSW and WA signal early movement toward a more active regulatory posture on uranium and nuclear energy, reflecting broader shifts in how critical minerals are being considered in an energy security context.

Some of these developments, including those triggered by the impacts of the conflict in Iran, signal an evolution in the Government’s approach to critical minerals. The Critical Minerals Strategic Reserve, announced on 12 January 2026 (Strategic Reserve), and The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Amendment (Strategic Reserve) Act 2026 (Strategic Reserve Act), which came into effect on 1 April 2026, mark a shift toward a more interventionist policy framework. Together, these measures reflect growing recognition that critical minerals policy must address not only export strength, but also domestic supply assurance and resilience.

Under this framework, a $1.2 billion Strategic Reserve will be established to promote investment in critical minerals projects, secure rights to those minerals, and enable on-selling by Government to meet demand from domestic and international buyers.⁷ The initial focus of the Strategic Reserve is on promoting a limited set of minerals which are crucial for clean-energy, high-technology manufacturing and defence applications. While a key objective is to strengthen supply chains for Australia’s international trading partners such as the United States, Japan, South Korea and Canada, these measures also highlight the importance of domestic availability, particularly in relation to fuel security and minerals critical to economic and national security. The Strategic Reserve Act also further expands Export Finance Australia’s functions, including the ability to secure, sell and selectively stockpile fuel, critical minerals and other materials that may be produced domestically or imported, with a focus on addressing import vulnerability alongside export opportunity.

In combination, these developments underscore the importance of ensuring that policy frameworks for strategic national resources support domestic availability as well as export. Taking account of the expected global importance of uranium, particularly in the defence and energy sectors, there is a strong case for applying a similarly structured, long-term approach to uranium.

Uranium as a strategic asset: energy and policy implications for Australia 

The growing international focus on uranium as a critical input to both defence capability and energy security, alongside its inclusion on the critical or strategic minerals lists of key global trading partners, are important strategic considerations for Government in determining how uranium and nuclear energy are positioned within Australia’s long-term regulatory frameworks.

While significant hurdles remain – not least the need to secure and maintain a social licence – global market developments point to nuclear power playing an expanding role in future energy systems. In that context, there is merit in considering the regulatory, governance and policy settings that would be required to support any future development of the uranium and nuclear sectors in Australia in a safe and efficient way. 

Assessing whether uranium should be included in Australia’s Critical Minerals List, or otherwise treated as strategically important from a policy perspective, and examining what a credible regulatory roadmap for nuclear energy could involve, are practical steps that, if considered now, could strengthen long-term strategic preparedness.

^{[1] The global shift towards low-carbon energy systems depends on minerals such as lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements for batteries, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and solar panels. AI data centres are becoming one of the most mineral-intensive components of the digital economy, consuming significant quantities of copper, aluminium, and rare earth elements. Defence systems are highly mineral-intensive. Rare earth elements are used in high-performance permanent magnets found in guided missiles, fighter jets, and satellite communications. Antimony is used in night-vision equipment and flame-retardant materials; gallium is used in advanced semiconductors deployed in radar systems and telecommunications; tungsten is used in armour-piercing munitions and jet engines.}

^{[2] This includes the United States, Canada, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, France, India and Japan.}

^{[3] Australia currently ranks as the world’s fourth largest producer and market concentration is high. Kazakhstan, Canada, and Namibia alone account for approximately three-quarters of global uranium mine output.}

^{[4] Australian uranium can only be sold to countries with which Australia has a nuclear cooperation agreement, and has safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including an Additional Protocol.} 

^{[5] Australia’s Critical Minerals List was last updated on 20 February 2024, in line with the Resource Minister’s decision of 16 February 2024, and will be reviewed at least every three years.} 

^{[6] High‑profile transactions in this period included multiple long‑term PPAs and strategic partnerships between large technology companies and US nuclear operators, spanning both existing reactor restarts and new capacity. Individual deals ranged from several hundred megawatts to well over 1 GW, with aggregate commitments running into multiple gigawatts. These arrangements include agreements tied to operating plants, as well as forward commitments to emerging technologies such as SMRs and other advanced nuclear projects, alongside a growing pipeline of similar transactions involving SMR developers and broader corporate procurement programs. These PPAs – which are typically long-term (15-25 years), bespoke, and increasingly structured as forward-start agreements tied to reactor construction milestones – signal a fundamental shift in corporate energy procurement strategy, with nuclear moving from a niche sustainability gesture to a core pillar of data centre power sourcing, though significant risks remain around SMR construction cost overruns, regulatory complexity, and the fact that the first dedicated SMR capacity is not expected to be operational before 2030.}

^{[7] These are antimony, gallium and rare earth elements which all appear on Australia’s Critical Minerals List.}